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$EVWUDFW
This working paper examines some of the decision criteria suggested by theories on decision
making under uncertainty. This is done by applying the criteria to the problem of global
warming. It is shown that even if there was a benevolent planner who is both supranational
and supragenerational, and even if he had a well-defined intergenerational welfare function,
there are still remaining problems. The question asked is: ,I there were a benevolent planner,
would he know the best climate policy for the world today?
The main discussion abstracts from all other complications and focus on the lack of certainty
regarding impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and the effectiveness of policy. A very
simplified example of a game against nature is constructed. It has two possible policy choices:
One can either try to prevent global warming, or one can choose to do nothing. The future
state of the world is uncertain, and the chosen policy might affect the outcome in each state.
The framing of the example is such that one should expect a policy of action to be preferred,
rather than a no-action policy, however this is not always the case. It is shown that the
preferred policy choice is very much dependent on the choice of decision criterion, the
magnitude of costs and of the framing.
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It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty (Knight, 1971). The
essence of the climate problem is thus action according to opinion, of greater or less
foundation and value, neither entire ignorance nor complete and perfect information, but
partial knowledge.
This essay examines, in the light of the climate problem, some of the decision criteria
suggested by theories on decision making under uncertainty. It shows that even if there was a
benevolent planner who is both supranational and supragenerational, and even if we had a
well-defined intergenerational welfare function, there are still problems remaining. The
question is: ,I there were a benevolent planner, would he know the best climate policy for the
world today? The main discussion abstracts from all other complications and focus on the
lack of certainty regarding impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and the effectiveness of
policy. It shows that the preferred policy choice is very much dependent on the choice of
decision criterion. Furthermore it is dependent on the magnitude of costs and of the framing;
how states of nature is defined, and of the subjective beliefs about the probability distribution
of states.
The global warming debate has shown that there are two major risks of concern. The first is
the risk of significant human and ecosystem impacts from large-scale climate change in the
next century, a potential environmental problem of immense dimensions. The second is the
risk of incurring large economic costs now, for policies that might slow global warming or
mitigate its impacts, when there is considerable uncertainty about the effectiveness of the
policies as well as the severity of the problem. The debate has been over scientific evidence,
but the fundamental issue of separating the two sides is rather which risk is perceived to be
the greater threat (Colgazier 1991).
The supporters of the first risk being the greater argue that because of the uncertainty one
should abate greenhouse gases now, in order to reduce the possibility of extensive damage.
By reference to the precautionary principle, they look upon abatement as an insurance against
catastrophic events. Their point is that uncertainty alone gives rise to a willingness to pay for
insurance. One could easily draw a parallel to fire insurance, which is considered wise, even if
one is not realistically expecting ones house to burn down.
The supporters of the second risk, however, argue that we should not impose strong policies
before the state of knowledge has improved significantly. By postponing action, they argue,
we may learn more about the effects and find new and cleaner technologies. Meanwhile, we
can invest in alternative projects, which will make us more prepared to both abatement of
greenhouse gases and to adapt to changes in the future (Kolstad 1994).
Both sides place the burden of proof on the other, and which group is right seems to be a
matter of beliefs. If we believe that the probabilities of severe damage or catastrophic events
are small, then a wait-and-see strategy is preferable. If, however, we believe the probability is
non-negligible, immediate action must be the best strategy. This gives rise to another
important question: How small must the probabilities of severe damage or catastrophic events
be, in order to be considered negligible? This is much more difficult to answer. As climate
change is a long-term global problem, it rises moral and intergenerational issues, and
questions regarding less developed countries.
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Theories on decision making under uncertainty have suggested various decision criteria. I will
in the following examine some of these principles in the light of the climate problem. When
discussing a decision criterion there are several possible approaches: one is to look at the
axiomatic foundation; another is to focus on the practical implications; and, a third is to do
both.
If accepting the axiomatic foundation underlying the criterion, then you must also accept their
implications. However, axioms are abstract and often difficult to fully understand. Therefore
it can be wise to look at their implications when applied to a specific problem. Philosophers2
say we have a reflective equilibrium, when there is accordance between the intuition about the
abstract implications of the axioms and the intuition of the practical implication they have, or
ought to have, when applied to a problem. If this is not the case, one could adjust the axioms
and compare again.
By applying the criteria to the problem of global warming, I whish to learn more about the
implications of using the different decision criteria in a frame of uncertainty. The aim is to try
to learn something about the criteria by moving back and forth between the abstract principles
and the problem we would like to solve. As an illustration I will construct a very simplified
example of a game against nature, with two possible policies: We can either try to prevent
global warming, or we can choose to do nothing. The future state of the world is uncertain,
and the chosen policy might affect the outcome in each state. The framing of the example is
such that one should expect a policy of action to be preferred, rather than a no-action policy,
however this is not always the case.
                                                          
2
 See for example John Rawls (1971)
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A situation is said to involve ULVN if the attached randomness can be expressed in terms of
specific numerical probabilities. These probabilities are objectively specified, as with lottery
tickets, or a dice: The numbers are known. However, situations where one cannot (or does
not) assign actual probabilities to the alternative possible occurrences are said to involve
XQFHUWDLQW\. In this case probabilities reflect the individuals own subjective beliefs: The
numbers are unknown (Knight 1971).
The question of human made global warming definitely abounds in scientific uncertainty;
uncertainties in predicting the timing and magnitude of future climate change caused by
greenhouse gas emissions; uncertainties in predicting the ecological, economic, social and
political impacts; and uncertainties in predicting the effectiveness and costs of policy options.
(Colgazier 1991) On this background, one might expect the question of how to deal with the
uncertainties related to climate change to be well understood. But this is not the case. Experts
disagree significantly in their recommendations of how to act3.
Referring to the precautionary principle, some argue that we should cut emissions of
greenhouse gases now. The precautionary principle has many definitions. Among the
common themes are the undesirability of irreversible damage, the need to prevent and
anticipate damage, and that lack of complete scientific uncertainty should not be used as an
excuse for inaction (Harding & Fisher 1992). The Bergen Ministerial Declaration from 1990
states that the precautionary principle suggests that: “Where there are threats of serious or
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for
postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.” This suggests that there is a case
for reducing carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions now, even if it is uncertain
whether these emissions are contributing to the greenhouse problem, and the economic costs
are uncertain, even if greenhouse damages would be inflicted (Chrisholm & Clarke 1993).
This interpretation is, of course, dependent on the belief of the climate problem as  “threats of
serious or irreversible damage”.
The experts who question the view of the climate problem as “threats of serious or
irreversible damage”, argue that one should not impose strong policies before the level of
knowledge has improved. It is hardly controversial to state that we need to improve the
knowledge of the impacts of climate change in order to design a better climate policy. Yet, we
do not know whether improved knowledge implies less uncertainty. This is why we need
more discussion of framing, what information is needed, and how to use available knowledge
about the uncertainty, in order to make better decisions.
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 This is discussed further in Bretteville & Aaheim, 1999.
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What is the best way to approach the climate problem? When making policy choices under
scientific uncertainty in areas characterized by disagreement among experts, value judgement
will have to be made about what counts as evidence. The question thus becomes; what
scientific evidence is sufficient and admissible to justify a policy decision under these
conditions? Where to set these standards of proof – how sure is sure enough – is a value
judgement. People’s values are affected both by their general principles of rights and
responsibilities and by their self-interest. They might primarily be concerned about a fair
decision-making process or about the fairness of outcomes. Values are significant with
respect to a fair allocation of the costs, benefits and risks to initial stakeholders, and also with
respect to a fair outcome for society as a whole, incorporating goals such as efficiency,
stability, political feasibility, and legitimacy (Colgazier 1991).
Value judgements about risks and impacts are intertwined with evidential judgements about
how sure is sure enough. The conclusions from a discussion of these issues are strongly
connected to whom is asked. Both the global and the intergenerational dimension of the
climate problem emphasize this (Malnes 1997). One cannot expect to solve such a complex
problem with one ethical rule (Ringius 1999).
In the following section I will look past these dimensional problems and introduce a
benevolent planner or principal as a theoretical abstraction. His goal is to decide what the
world should agree upon, given that all problems regarding coordination and feasibility are or
will be solved. In other words, I will assume that the planner has the right preferences, from
an objective social point of view. He will thus take all relevant factors into consideration and
decide in a morally consistent manner. This way I abstract from all other complications and
focus on the lack of certainty regarding impacts of greenhouse gas emissions and the
effectiveness of policy. The question is: ,I there were a benevolent planner, would he know
the best climate policy for the world today? This will be discussed in light of a few decision
criteria.
&,&(52:RUNLQJ3DSHU
Decision criteria under uncertainty and the climate problem
10
 7KHZHOIDUHIXQFWLRQ
Consider an economy with a benevolent planner, which cares about the ’bulk’ of future
welfare, :, emerging from output from resources (capital) and the damage from climate
change. Damage can be reduced by abatement, D. The policy goal of the planner is to
maximize future welfare with given resources. The resources can be utilized for investments
or abatement. Due to the uncertainty of the climate indicator, the effect of abatement on
climate is uncertain. Abatement can be interpreted partly as a way to reduce the expected
damage. Implicitly one can also interpret abatement as a mean to change the probability
distribution for future damage.
I will in the following decision criteria discussion use a reduced form of the welfare function:
: : D V= ,1 6 ( 4.1 )
The welfare is thus a function of abatement, D, and V that is a parameter, or a vector of
parameters, over which we have no control. V is thus representing the uncertainty in the
model, and it is defined such that a high V is good, and a low Vis bad. This welfare function is
aggregated both over groups and over time in a suitable manner. How this should be done is a
controversial matter, which will be abstracted from in the criteria discussion. Some of these
controversial issues, however, are touched upon in the remaining of this section.
 'LPHQVLRQDOSUREOHPV
There are both intergenerational and transboundary problems with using but one welfare
function. How would a benevolent planner weight different people, within and between
generations? Are they supposed to have equal weights? The present generation is set to take
care of the interests of future generations. This might be a problem. Do we care enough about
the poor people of future generations in developing countries?
These questions lead to the moral aspect of the climate problem. Until recently, the developed
part of the world has been the main contributor to emissions of greenhouse gases.
Furthermore, the developing countries are likely to suffer the greatest losses, should climate
change occur. The major sectors likely to be affected by climate change, are agriculture,
together with forestry and fisheries. Agriculture plays an especially large role in the economic
life of developing countries, trough food prices. Another major threat is sea level rise.
Bangladesh, and a number of island economies are directly threatened by the potentially
devastating effects of a rise in sea level. Thus, susceptibility of developing countries to
climate change is likely to be much greater than for most developed countries. In addition,
developing countries have a lower capacity than developed countries to adapt in the face of
climate change (Chrisholm & Clarke 1993).
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 'LVFRXQWLQJ"
Another important issue is the question of discounting. One argument for discounting over
time is that consumers are impatient, they have a preference of immediate over postponed
consumption. A second is that the marginal utility of consumption decline with growing per
capita consumption. One could question, however, the validity of the first argument, when
discussing discounting in the light of the climate problem. Here we are talking about
consumption fifty, hundred or several hundred years ahead. It might be difficult to justify the
impatience argument, considering the time horizon. It is not the same generation consuming
today and a hundred years from now. Impatience then becomes a question of moral. Some
might consider it egoistic to say that our consumption today is more important, or more
valuable, than the consumption of the generations to follow.
The second argument follows from an assumption about continuing future growth, which
implies increased future consumption. Assuming decreasing marginal utility, this future
consumption will be of less value, on the margin. This means that, given continued growth,
the last unit consumed in the future has less utility value than the last unit consumed today.
It is important to note, however, that this is not about saving for the future, but rather making
intergenerational transfers forward in time. We are not the ones who will consume the long-
term benefits we are attempting to bring about if we reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
This is not a savings program; it is an aid program. If the economic sacrifices in the interest of
climate change remedial activity is borne by the countries that can best afford it, the transfers
will tend to be from people in the developed part of the world, to people in the less developed
parts. Hopefully the residents of the developing countries will be far better off a century from
now than they are today. However, they may not yet be as well off then, as people in the
developed part of the world is today (Schelling 1993).
 7LPHLQFRQVLVWHQF\
One of the responsibilities of present policy makers is to take care of the interests of future
generations. It is a common experience, however, that people tend to postpone unpleasant
tasks, preferring to have them done in the next period, even if it might be optimal to complete
the task now. This might also apply to policy makers, and will probably reflect time-
inconsistent preferences.
A decision rule is said to be time-consistent if at each decision node reached when the rule is
followed, the decision rule is still optimal in the sense of maximizing the welfare as evaluated
at the reached node. Considering the climate issue, policy makers preferences (and they might
also reflect the preferences of the present generation) seem to give extra weight to current
welfare over future welfare. These present-biased-preferences might lead to procrastination of
climate change remedial action, a decision that might be time-inconsistent (Asheim 1997,
O’Donoghue &  Rabin 1999). The incentives to procrastinate stem from the fact that the
policy makers plan to do a task based on its long-run benefits, and these benefits are strongly
dependent on whether or not they accept taking on the costs of greenhouse gas abatement
today.
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A decision problem is defined by the acts or options among which one must choose, the
possible outcomes or consequences of these acts, and the contingencies or conditional
probabilities that relate outcomes to acts (Tversky & Kahneman 1987). The problem raised
above about whether we should abate now or wait until later, is very much a question about
which decision criteria we choose.
A major theory of decision-making under uncertainty is the expected utility model. This
model is based on a set of axioms, which provide criteria for the rationality of choices. In
short, the preferences have the following properties: The individual’s choice among actions
can be represented by an ordering, and the choices are continuos. This means that, given any
two actions, the individual prefers one to the other or else regards them as indifferent (the
axiom of connectedness). Furthermore, if an individual is to choose between three actions a, b
and c, and he prefers a to b, or is indifferent between them, and the same holds between b and
c, then he must prefer a to c or be indifferent between them (the axiom of transitivity). The
axiom of continuity demands that if action a is preferred to action b, then any action
sufficiently close to a is also preferred to b, and action a is preferred to any action sufficiently
close to b.
Additionally, the expected utility model assumes conditional preferences and probabilistic
beliefs. If the individual is given information that certain states of nature are impossible, he
reforms his beliefs about the remaining states of nature. On the basis of these new beliefs, he
forms a new ordering of the actions. The axiom of conditional preferences then asserts that
the ordering will depend only of the consequences of the actions for those states of the world
not ruled out by the information. Probabilistic beliefs mean that if the probability distribution
of consequences is the same for two actions, they are considered indifferent (Arrow 1965).
The choices of an individual, whose actions are consistent with the axioms, can be described
in terms of the utilities of various outcomes for that individual. The utility of a risky prospect
is equal to the expected utility of its outcomes, obtained by weighing the utility of each
possible outcome by its probability. When faced with a choice, the model says that a rational
decision-maker prefer the prospect that offers the highest expected utility.
 0D[LPL]LQJH[SHFWHGVRFLDOZHOIDUH
This criterion can be formulated as follows:
max ,
$
V
(: $ V1 6< A ( 5.1 )
Where $ is the policy choice that determines the level of abatement. :$Vdenotes the social
welfare as a function of the planners policy choice and uncertainty. Thus, the criterion says
that one should choose the level of abatement that maximizes the expected social welfare. 
Suppose the planner has to choose between climate change remedial action, or action
according to the precautionary principle (PP), as it also will be denoted here, and no action
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(NA). The problem is interpreted as a game against nature, a non-strategic player. This is a
common way of illustrating decision problems, and the example used builds especially on
Chrisholm & Clarke 1993. Suppose further that the costs of adopting the precautionary
principle, denoted &, include both the policy costs and the social costs of output forgone. The
possible damage from climate change is denoted ', and I assume that this damage is far
greater that the cost of implementing a policy of remedial action. In the following I assume
the damage from future climate change to be at least three times the cost of implementing the
precautionary principle ' &> 3 .
Suppose also that there are three possible future states of the world:
S1 = damage from climate change (D) is severe in the absence of PP
S2 = damage from climate change is insignificant in the absence of PP
S3 = damage from climate change is severe in the absence of PP, and PP is ineffective
If action according to the precautionary principle is put in, and this policy turns out effective,
the damage, ' is prevented. & and ' are measured in units of social welfare, and thus reflect
properties of the welfare function, such as risk aversion.
Everything else equal, we can compare the social welfare generated by the two policies in
each state of nature.
: 33 6 &
: 1$ 6 '
: 33 6 & HWF
,
,
, .
1
1
2
1 6
1 6
1 6
= -
= -
= -
( 5.2 )
This calculation gives the following table (all numbers in absolute values):
States:Strategy:
S1 S2 S3
PP & & &'
NA '  '
When the probabilities are unknown, one might consider a uniform probability distribution.
Then, all states are given equal weights, and thus considered equally possible (S(Si)=1/3,
i=1,2,3). The expected social welfare of each of the two policies is then:
(: 33 V & '
(: 1$ V '
,
,
1 6
1 6
= - +


= -
1
3
2
3
( 5.3 )
The calculation shows that, given a uniform probability distribution, the expected social
welfare will be higher under remedial action (PP). The example shows that the planner should
choose the precautionary principle, according to the criterion of expected social welfare
maximization, if and only if:
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' &> 3 ( 5.4 )
Which is fulfilled according to the assumption made about the relative size of costs.
Another usual solution, when the probabilities are unknown, is to apply a symmetric bell-
shaped probability function. In our example, this means that you give a small probability to
state 1, an equally small to state 3, and a bigger to state 2. Consider for instance the case
where the probability of S2 is 1/2 (S(S2)=1/2), and the two other sates are equally likely
(S(S1)=S(S3)=1/4). In this situation one should choose action according to the precautionary
principle only if:
' &> 4 ( 5.5 )
Thus, no action will be preferred under this probability distribution. This seems sensible
considering that the heaviest weight is put on the case were climate change does not occur.
If the planner has reason to believe that state 1 is more likely to occur than the two other
states, the conclusion is modified. Consider for instance the case where the probability of S1 is
2/3 (S(S1)=2/3), and the two other sates are equally likely (S(S2)=S(S3)=1/6). Expected social
welfare is then:
(: 33 V & '
(: 1$ V '
,
,
1 6
1 6
= - +


= -
1
6
5
6
( 5.6 )
This probability distribution also implies selecting the precautionary principle if the damage
from climate change in the absence of this policy is sufficiently larger than the costs of
adapting it. Here, however, ' must be but one and a half times the size of &
' &> 3
2
( 5.7 )
Thus, the relative restriction for choosing action is halved compared to the restriction under a
uniform probability distribution. This also seems sensible considering that the heaviest weight
is put on the case were climate change occur and the policy is effective.
These calculations illustrates the obvious point that decisions according to maximizing
expected welfare, is highly dependent on the probability distribution and the relative
magnitude of costs. Furthermore it reflects full confidence in our subjective probability
believes underlying V. This is not completely realistic, due to the complex uncertainty
structure of the climate problem.
Expected utility theory is very useful for dealing with situations where probabilities and
possible outcomes are within the normal range of human experience. The climate problem is
&,&(52:RUNLQJ3DSHU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not within this range. We simply do not have the experience to calculate proper weights to
aggregate utility over states. Non-probabilistic decision criteria, to which we now turn, might
therefor be more suitable.
 0LQLPD[
The minimax criterion says that one should maximize the welfare in the worst possible case.
Essentially it allows loss-aversion to become infinite:
  
m ax m in ,
$ V
: $ V1 6J L ( 5.8 )
This is a very conservative or cautious criterion, and it might be looked upon as an extreme
version of the precautionary principle, but this is not always the case.
Adopting the precautionary principle implies acting to avoid unfavorable events, regardless of
their likelihood. Let us try to analyze the rationale of this policy decision as a minimax
strategy by looking at the example derived in the previous subsection:
States:Strategy:
S1 S2 S3
Max Loss:
PP & & &' &'
NA '  ' '
Considering the possibility of policy ineffectiveness, the worst possible outcome is to
implement a costly precautionary principle strategy that fails to avert severe damages.
However, if we ignore the third state, where the precautionary principle strategy is ineffective,
we can see that the minimax criterion, implies always selecting action according to the
precautionary principle. Thus, unless there is no uncertainty regarding the policy
effectiveness, the precautionary principle can not be rationalized as the appropriate minimax
strategy in this game against nature4.
 *HQHUDOL]HGPLQLPD[PD[LPD[
This criterion can be formalized as follows:
max min , max ,
$ V V
: $ V : $ Va a1 6 1 6 1 6J L+ -1 ( 5.9 )
This is a non-probabilistic decision criterion, which says that one should choose the level of
abatement so as to maximize a weighed average of the social welfare in the best and the worst
situation, with respect to the uncertain parameter. The size of a  can be interpreted as if it
reflects the planner’s beliefs about the likelihood of facing the worst case in the future. This is
                                                          
4
 This conclusion is of course dependent on the belief that & is negative. If not, that is if the secondary benefits
from PP outweighs the implementation costs, PP is always superior (See section 6).
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then a simplification of the expected welfare criterion. We can either find the worst and the
best case with appurtenant subjective probabilities, or we can divide all possible outcomes
into two groups; the bad outcomes and the better outcomes. With this angle of incidence, the
interpretation of a  will be the possibility of realizing one of the bad outcomes.
Using our very simplified example, the planner is to choose the maximum of:
33 ' &
1$ '
:
:
- +
-
a
a
1 6 ( 5.10 )
Thus, as with the minimax criterion, no action will be preferred, unless there is no uncertainty
regarding the policy effectiveness4. This result holds regardless of the size of a . If, however,
we know for certain that the precautionary principle strategy will be effective, we will choose
this policy as long as we believe ' to be twice the size of &:
' &> 2 ( 5.11 )
which holds by assumption.
 /LPLWHGGHJUHHRIFRQILGHQFH
This criterion is as follows:
max , min ,
$
V
V
(: $ V : $ Vg g1 6 1 6 1 6J L+ -1 ( 5.12 )
Here the planner maximizes a weighed sum of the expected social welfare criterion and the
minimax criterion.  The g ³ 0 1, , measures the planner’s degree of confidence in the
probability distribution underlying (:. For the case of full confidence, g =1, he will use the
expected social welfare criterion, whereas under complete uncertainty, g = 0 , the minimax
decision rule arises. Thus, 1- g  denotes the degree of uncertainty. In this interpretation,
uncertainty is simply the counterpart of confidence in the probabilistic assessment underlying
the expected social welfare calculation (Stigum 1990, Eichberger & Spaniels1998).
Again, using the simple example with a uniform probability distribution, the Planner is to
choose the maximum of:
33 & '
1$ '
:
:
- + -



! 
"
$#
- -


1 2
3
1 1
3
g
g
( 5.13 )
showing that equally possible states favor the precautionary principal strategy when:
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' &> 1 3
g
( 5.14 )
The restriction on the magnitude of damage from climate change in the absence of remedial
action, relative to the costs of adapting this policy, is scaled with the degree of confidence in
the probability distribution. We have that the higher the degree of confidence, the lower the
restriction. For the case of full confidence, g =1, we have exactly the expected utility
restriction (equation ( 5.4 )), and the planner will choose action, but when the degree of
confidence is weaker, g <1, no action will be preferred. Then the minimax criterion, which is
reflecting extreme fear of the worst case, dominates the expected welfare criterion
completely.
The symmetric bell-shaped probability distribution yields the restriction: Select the
precautionary principle if:
' &> 1 4
g
( 5.15 )
Given our assumption about the relative size of & and', the planner chooses the
precautionary principle if g > 4
3
, which, by assumption, never is fulfilled. Thus, the
symmetric probability distribution goes in favor of no action, which is natural, considering the
probability distribution.
However, considering the probability distribution S(S1)=2/3, and S(S2)=S(S3)=1/6, the
planner will select the precautionary principle policy if :
' &> 1 3
2g
( 5.16 )
Full confidence, again, gives the expected utility restriction (equation ( 5.7 )), but sufficiently
low confidence in the probability distribution gives no action. If the damage from climate
change is three times the costs of action, the planner will choose the policy according to the
precautionary principle if g > 1
2
.
 0LQLPD[UHJUHW
Minimax regret (or loss) minimizes the difference between the best that could happen and
what actually happens (Fishburn 1987). The planner seeks to minimize his regrets for not
having, in hindsight, made the superior choice. This could be interpreted as choosing the
option, in which the planner believes future generations would least regret:
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min max , ,
$ V
: $ V V : $ V* -1 62 7 1 6J L ( 5.17 )
When V is known, then $ V*1 6would be the optimal choice of $. The criterion then says that
one should minimize the maximal regret. In other words, you choose the policy that makes
the maximal error as small as possible. This might be a way for the politicians to minimize the
ex post critique.
Minimax regret may be particularly relevant when policies serve a dual purpose. In many
instances, actions to combat local environmental problems protect biodiversity, and so forth,
will simultaneously have a desirable impact on global warming. Conversely, policies aimed at
combating an enhanced greenhouse effect, such as reducing forms of air pollution, caused by
using fossil fuels, and the lowering of clear-felling of rainforests, will also often help alleviate
local environmental problems. These dual-purpose policies are particularly attractive if there
is a significant chance that either a greenhouse problem will not occur or that human
preventive action will be ineffective. This is illustrated in the game against nature, previously
analyzed. The minimax regret cost matrix for this game will be:
States:Strategy:
S1 S2 S3
Max Regret:
PP 0 C C C
NA D-C 0 0 D-C
Thus, the maximum regret incurs either when the precautionary principle policy is ineffective,
or when the planner finds it unnecessary, ex post. When applying the policy of no action, the
maximum regret is the loss from not implementing the precautionary principle when doing so
could have prevented large damages. When comparing these regrets, we see that the
precautionary principle should be implemented on the basis of the minimax regret criterion if
&'& or equivalently:
D > 2C ( 5.18 )
which holds by assumption.
 6DIHW\ILUVW
Another way of showing precaution is by lowering the probability of the future welfare being
too low. Here are two alternatives:
min Pr ,
$
: $ V N1 6= B ( 5.19 )
max , Pr ,
$
V
(: $ V : $ V N1 6< A 1 6= B  s.t    b ( 5.20 )
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The first alternative, a probabilistic non-expected utility criterion (equation ( 5.19 ),
minimizes the probability of the welfare being less than some constant, N. The second
alternative (equation ( 5.20 ) maximizes the expected social welfare, subject to a constraint,
which says that the probability of the welfare being less than N, should be less than b .
In addition to the problems discussed, regarding expected social welfare and the uncertainty
structure of the climate problem, the safety first criteria pose questions about how to
determine N and b . What determines the acceptable size of b , the probability of the future
welfare being less than N? How likely can it be? This question might depend on the size of N.
How low a welfare can we accept? This is again dependent on whether or not N measures the
welfare on average. If so, is this a weighed average, and how then are the weighs determined?
And how disaggregated is it? Is N a weighed sum of each group, land or region? However,
even if N and b  is determined, facing the uncertainty, how can the planner know that a certain
policy decision will satisfy the constraints?
Another safety first approach is to have constraints on the welfare of the worst off group, land
or region. One example might be:
max , Pr min ,
$
V
L
L
(: $ V : $ V N1 6< A 1 6J L  s.t    b ( 5.21 )
Here the planner is supposed to maximize the expected future social welfare subject to the
probability of the welfare of the worst off, being less than b .  If b  is equal to zero, the
constraint can be interpreted as a floor. If the size Nis chosen properly, this criterion will
ensure a sustainable development. Loosely, a sustainable development demands each
generation to not use more than their legitimate part of the world’s resources (Asheim 1993).
If one or several generations have too high a consumption, or their consumption generates too
much pollution, this undermines the consumption possibilities of later generations. If so, the
later generations might not be able to reach the social welfare level N, and the criterion is
violated.
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 &RQFOXVLRQV
The above discussion has shown that the preferred policy choice is very much dependent on
the choice of decision criterion. Furthermore it is dependent on the magnitude of costs and the
framing: on how states of nature is defined, and on the subjective beliefs about the probability
distribution of states. Considering the fact that the example is constructed in such a way that
one should expect a policy of action to be chosen in preference to a policy of no action, the
conclusions are somewhat surprisingly divided.
In the example examined, the maximizing expected welfare criterion favors action according
to the precautionary principle when the probability distribution is uniform or skewed in favor
of state 1. When a symmetric bellshaped probability distribution is applied, however, no
action is preferred.
The minimax criterion and the generalized minimax / maximax criterion never favors action
as long as there are uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of the remedial policy, unless ±
&! of course. This might be the case if the secondary benefits from climate change remedial
action are greater than the costs.
Policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by reducing the burning of fossil fuels will also
reduce other emissions. They may also reduce road traffic. It is well accepted that the
pollution of these other emissions and the effects from road traffic, such as accidents and
noise, are responsible for substantial external costs. It is the reduction of these various
negative external effects, pursuant on policies to abate greenhouse gas emissions, which are
the secondary benefits of such policies (Ekins, 1996, Aunan et al. 1998). If the secondary
benefits are sufficiently large, the costs of implementing the abatement policy will be
outweighed. If this is the case, we will have ±&! and the remedial policy will always be
preferred, regardless of the policies’ effect on climate change, and regardless of the criterion
chosen.
Using the criterion of limited degree of confidence, the uniform probability distribution
suggests action only if the planner has complete confidence in the underlying probability
distribution. Using the skewed distribution, remedial action is preferred only if g !. The
symmetric bell-shaped distribution, however, always points in the direction of no action.
The minimax regret criterion always favors action under the assumptions given in the
example examined. Thus, action according to the precautionary principle cannot be
rationalized as a minimax strategy in this game against nature. However, applying the notion
of regret changes this conclusion.
It is thus the maximizing expected social welfare, the limited degree of confidence and the
minimax regret criteria that yields the desired conclusion of action. The former two also has
the property that when the greatest weight is given the state where climate change does not
occur (the symmetric bell-shaped distribution), no action is preferred.
Carefully constructed experiments, however, have shown that people tend to place greater
weight on low-probability extreme events than the expected utility theory predicts
(Kahnemann & Tversky 1979, Chrisholm & Clarke 1993). This implies that if the welfare
function is utilitarian, in the sense that the social preferences are the sum of the individuals
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subjective preferences, it will place too much weight on extreme events. This functional form
might not be adequate, however, when approaching the climate problem. We do not know the
preferences of future generations. Furthermore, even if people, as individuals place higher
weights on low-probability extreme events, this does not mean that the planner ought to do
the same. That is an entirely different discussion.
The theory of expected utility requires that an ordering can represent individual’s choice
among actions. This means that the decider must have a complete overview of possible states
of nature and their probabilities. Given the uncertainty structure of the climate problem, this is
a very strong assumption. Yet, expected utility or welfare may provide an adequate
framework for explaining and predicting social choice in uncertain situations. When using the
other criteria, similar information problems must be faced.
The class of safety first criteria, for instance, has similar information problems, in addition to
the problems of deciding upon the strictness of restrictions. The idea of safeguarding the
worst off from too low a level of welfare seems sensible. However, in extreme cases, this
might mean that one should make the majority much worse off to benefit the worst off
marginally.
Using minimax when deciding is reflecting extreme fear of the worst case. There is a
problem, however, to know the nature of the worst case. What is the worst that can happen as
a consequence of human made climate change? Another problem is that the worst case can be
so bad that the policy decision becomes irrelevant. The worst case can be a catastrophe of
such dimensions that a decision between doing this or that might not have significant
influence over the outcome.
Applying the notion of regret to the minimax criterion gives more desired conclusions. On the
one hand, the minimax regret rule is criticized on the grounds that regret consists of  “crying
over spilt milk”, which the proverb says is not the way to optimize. On the other hand, the
minimax rule, sensibly gives some weight to the relationship between the costs of
implementing a precautionary policy and the loss of doing nothing when the damages caused
by global warming turns out large. This holds even when there is uncertainty about whether or
not the precautionary policy will be effective (Chrisholm & Clarke 1993). However, it might
not be too easy to define and measure the regrets.
We have seen that despite the simplifying assumptions of having a benevolent planner who is
both supranational and supragenerational, and having a well-defined intergenerational welfare
function, there are still problems remaining. Thus, when balancing the environmental
irreversibility, the risk of an acceleration of mitigation policies if the worst happens, with the
investment irreversibility, the risk of over-cautious policies, the challenge should not be to
find the best policy today for the next hundred years, but to select a prudent strategy and to
adjust it over time in the light of new information (IPCC 1995). Selecting such a strategy is a
major challenge for the policymakers of today.
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